Sales and Firm Entry: The Case of Wal-Mart by Glandon, PJ & Jaremski, Matthew
Colgate University Libraries
Digital Commons @ Colgate
Economics Faculty Working Papers Economics
1-1-2012
Sales and Firm Entry: The Case of Wal-Mart
PJ Glandon
Kenyon College, glandonp@kenyon.edu
Matthew Jaremski
Colgate University, mjaremski@colgate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.colgate.edu/econ_facschol
Part of the Economics Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Digital Commons @ Colgate. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics Faculty Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Colgate. For more information, please contact
skeen@colgate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Glandon, PJ and Jaremski, Matthew, "Sales and Firm Entry: The Case of Wal-Mart" (2012). Economics Faculty Working Papers. Paper
35.
http://commons.colgate.edu/econ_facschol/35
 Sales and Firm Entry: The Case of Wal-Mart 
 
 
 
 
By PJ Glandon and Matthew Jaremski1 
May 2012 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Temporary price reductions or “sales” have become increasingly important in the evolution of 
the price level. We present a model of repeated price competition to illustrate how entry causes 
incumbents to alternate between high and low prices. Using a six year panel of weekly 
observations from a grocery chain, we find that individual stores employ more sales as the 
distance to Wal-Mart falls. Moreover, the increase in the frequency of sales was concentrated on 
the most popular products, suggesting the use of a loss-leader strategy. 
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1. Introduction 
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) found that the fraction of price quotes that are “sales” 
(i.e. temporary price reductions) has increased substantially over the last two decades. Certain 
product categories, such as breakfast cereal or potato chips, are now “on sale” twice as often as 
they were in the late 1980’s. Determining the cause of this trend is important not only for 
understanding why firms have sales, but also for the ongoing debate about the role that sales play 
in aggregate price adjustment.
2
 We examine one possible explanation for the rise in the 
frequency of sales: the diffusion of Wal-Mart stores. We show that frequent but temporary price 
reductions can be a rational response to firm entry and then show that a representative grocery 
chain appears to have responded this way to Wal-Mart’s entry.3  
The expansion of Wal-Mart dramatically altered the retail landscape. Since 1980, Wal-
Mart has grown from 300 stores located in 11 states to over 4,400 stores with locations in every 
state. The chain’s revenue is now over 8 percent of U.S. consumption expenditure on goods, and 
80% of grocery stores cited Wal-Mart-type stores as their biggest concern.
4
 Unlike traditional 
retailers who have periodic price reductions (i.e. sales), Wal-Mart attracts customers through 
“everyday low prices”. Capps Jr and Griffin (1998) estimated that competition with this strategy 
was responsible for a 21% reduction in purchases at incumbent stores.  
Many empirical studies have examined Wal-Mart's effect on the prices and revenue of 
incumbent retailers. Basker (2005) and Basker and Noel (2009) find that incumbents lower their 
average quarterly price over time, whereas Volpe and Lavoie (2008) find that the monthly prices 
of national brands are lowered further than those of private-label brands. Singh, Hansen, and 
                                                 
2
 See for example, Chevalier and Kashyap (2011), Eichenbaum, Jaimovich, and Rebelo (2011), Kehoe and Midrigan 
(2010), and Guimaraes and Sheedy (2011). 
3
 Throughout the rest of the paper, the term “sales” will only refer to temporary price reductions. We use the term 
revenue when we address the price times quantity sold.  
4
 National Grocers Association (2003) 
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Blattberg (2006) find that the majority of revenue lost to Wal-Mart is due to decreased customers 
rather than decreased baskets. More importantly, they argue that incumbents can significantly 
mitigate revenue losses by keeping just a few of their best customers. 
 To the best of our knowledge, only Ailawadi, et al. (2010) has addressed Wal-Mart’s 
effect on sales behavior using high frequency data. They find that the number of weekly sale 
prices decreases for supermarkets and increases for drug stores and mass format stores in 
response to Wal-Mart, but overall find that the responses were low in most cases. The limited 
response to Wal-Mart could be due to several limitations with their data. First, they examine the 
entry of Wal-Mart supercenters even though many of the locations were already served by a 
Wal-Mart discount store. As stores might have already adjusted to Wal-Mart, any additional 
entry might not have received a large response. Second, they focus on category-level data, while 
we find that changes to pricing strategy following Wal-Mart's entry depend on product specific 
characteristics.  
We begin by showing that an increase in sales could be an optimal response to Wal-Mart 
by recasting the repeated price competition model in Lal (1990). In the model, two incumbent 
firms sell to loyal customers and customers who only buy from the lowest priced firm. Both 
firms charge a high price in duopoly and split the market. When a third firm with a lower 
marginal cost and no loyal customers enters, the incumbent’s high prices are no longer optimal 
and they will do better by taking turns setting a low price. Similar to Wal-Mart, the entrant 
chooses a constant but low price strategy in order to capitalize on its low cost structure. 
Next, we use scanner data from the Dominick’s Finer Foods database to test whether the 
stores in the grocery chain responded to Wal-Mart entry with more frequent sales. The data span 
six years and consist of 2,874 products allowing us to control for unobserved heterogeneity at 
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very fine levels (e.g. the UPC-store). The data contains each store's location, allowing us to 
isolate Wal-Mart's effect on individual stores, and the sample period corresponds to the initial 
entry of Wal-Mart. We find that stores significantly increased their sales frequency as their 
distance to Wal-Mart declined. Consistent with a “loss-leader” strategy, the increases in sales 
frequency were concentrated on the most popular products. The adjustment of sales thus seems 
to be a competitive response to Wal-Mart and not a secular trend. 
 
2. A Repeated Game of Retail Price Competition with Firm Entry 
The Industrial Organization literature presents several reasons for the existence of 
temporary low prices or sales, but many of these models are unsuited for studying the frequency 
of sales. In Varian (1990), firms keep consumers (rationally) uninformed over time by choosing 
price randomly from a continuous distribution. However, the only unambiguous definition of a 
sale price in this model is that the lowest observed price is the sale price. This definition leaves 
no room for variation in the frequency of sales. In Conlisk, Gerstner, and Sobel (1984), a 
monopolist generally charges a high regular price but is occasionally induced into charging a 
temporarily low price when enough low reservation price consumers accumulate in the market. 
The model provides clear predictions about the frequency of sales, but the assumptions do not 
approximate the market for consumer packaged goods which we wish to study. 
The most compelling model for studying the frequency of sales in the context of firm 
entry is Lal (1990). He seeks to explain the peculiar fact that on any given week, either brand A 
or brand B could be found on sale in a single store, but never both. We recast this model to 
represent retailers who face the entry of a low cost competitor.
5
 We use the model to show that 
                                                 
5
 Due to our context, we take a different approach to proving the existence of the primary equilibrium. 
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firm entry may cause two incumbent firms to switch from charging the same price every period 
to a strategy of alternating between a high and a low price. 
 
2.1 Model Setup  
The model consists of a retail market in which there are initially two firms,   and  , 
(called “incumbents”) engaged in repeated Bertrand price competition. A third firm,  , (called 
the “entrant”) unexpectedly enters the market. Each firm maximizes discounted profits using a 
common discount rate of        . Firms   and   have a marginal cost of     and firm  ’s 
marginal cost is normalized to zero.  
There are two types of customers who purchase a homogeneous basket of goods from one 
of the firms in each period as long as the price is less than or equal to r.
6
 The first type of 
customer is loyal to one of the incumbent firms and will only purchase the basket from that firm. 
The second type of customer is a “switcher” who considers   and   to be perfect substitutes, but 
prefers them to   with varying intensity. The number of switchers is normalized to 1 and the 
number of loyal customers per incumbent is    . 
Because switchers prefer the incumbents, firm   must charge a price lower than the 
minimum of the incumbents’ prices to attract any customers.7 The lower     price is relative to 
          , the more units   will sell. Assuming without loss of generality that      , the 
fraction of switchers that will buy from firm   is characterized the following way: 
  s share of switchers    
 if      
     
 
if           
        
  (1)  
                                                 
6
 We assume that r > c.  
7
 The fraction of switchers that buy from firm   arises from a Hotelling model. See Appendix A for details. 
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Here   is a demand parameter that reflects the opportunity cost of visiting firm   instead of   or 
  (e.g. the cost per unit of distance to get to  ). Firms   and   will sell   baskets to their loyal 
consumers and the incumbent with the lower price of the two sill sell to the switchers who do not 
buy from firm  .8 
 
2.2 Model Results 
To understand how firm C’s entry changes the pricing strategies of A and B, we first 
analyze how they behave before C’s arrival. The maximum total profit in this duopoly occurs 
when both firms charge   every period and threaten to punish deviations with a finite period 
Nash reversion strategy. Proposition 1 describes this equilibrium and states the conditions under 
which the price of r can be supported.  
Proposition 1: If   
   
   
, then the following symmetric strategy profile is a pareto-
dominant sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium: Both firms charge a price of   in every 
period as long as both firms charged   in the previous period. If a firm deviates, both 
firms charge a price of   for the next     periods where   is the largest positive integer 
such that    
  
    
. In the     period following the deviation, firms resume charging a 
price of  . If either firm deviates, then the punishment restarts. 
Proof: See Appendix B. 
Once firm   enters the market, the game has several equilibria. We focus our attention on 
the pure strategy equilibria in which firm   plays a best response in each stage game.9 We argue 
                                                 
8
 For example, if         , then the revenue of      and   will be    ,        
     
 
 , and    
     
 
  
respectively. This assumes that           . If this is violated, then   gets either none or all of the switchers.  
9
 This does not imply that firm C is passive. It cannot force either of the incumbents out of the market because of the 
loyal customers and only competes with the lowest priced incumbent because of the switchers. 
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that Pure strategy equalibria are more plausible because they do not require firms to have a 
randomizing device or a mechanism for detecting deviations. Requiring the entrant to play a best 
response provides a simple equilibrium in which only the incumbents need punishments to 
support the equilibrium path.
10
 From this set of pure strategy equilibria, we focus on the one that 
maximizes the discounted profits of the incumbents.  
Once the entrant arrives, the equilibrium strategy that maximizes the incumbents’ joint 
profits involves the incumbents staggering and alternating prices between the monopoly price,    
and a lower price,   .11 That is to say that in any given period, one incumbent charges   and the 
other   and the in the following period they switch. This strategy can be supported without 
explicit collusion using a credible and effective punishment.
12
 The equations in (2) specify the 
punishment prices that   and   charge in the     period following a deviation from the 
equilibrium path: 
              
   
                
 
                
   
 
             
             
              
(2)  
On the equilibrium path, incumbent firms take turns charging   and     . If either 
deviates, they punish each other by charging a price of   for the next      periods. In period   , 
firm   only sells to its loyal customers at a price of   whereas firm   sells to some switchers by 
charging  .13 After period   , the incumbents return to alternating prices of   and   . If either of 
incumbent deviates, the punishment phase begins again. Proposition 2 states that the strategy 
                                                 
10
 This type of strategy is also consistent with Wal-Mart’s slogan at the time: “Always low prices. Always.” 
11
 See Appendix B for more detail. 
12
 The punishment must be finite because the incumbents have the option to charge   to   loyal consumers. 
13
 For convenience, the price   is set to equalize firm   and     discounted future profits following a deviation.  
 8 
 
 
profile described above is a sub-game perfect Nash Equilibrium as long as the discount rate is 
large enough.  
Proposition 2: As long as   is large enough14, there exists a sub-game perfect Nash 
Equilibrium strategy profile in which:  
1) Firm   charges a price of 
  
 
 in every period 
2) On the equilibrium path, firms   and   alternate between a price of   and 
   
 
 
             
3) Firms A and B punish each other as described in (2) for deviations from the 
equilibrium path. 
Proof: See Appendix B. 
Most models of imperfect competition predict a reduction in average price when a 
competitor enters a market.
15
 This model’s contribution is thus to suggest that firms have 
periodic sales instead of permanently lowering price. In this way, they are still able to keep some 
price sensitive shoppers, while continuing to profit on their loyal weekly customers. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 The model in Section 2 suggests that incumbent firms may use temporarily low prices to 
keep some price sensitive consumers from shopping at a new firm. However, there are many 
other reasons to have sales. For instance, firms could use sale prices to manage inventory, 
incentivize consumers to try new products, or price discriminate among shoppers already in the 
stores. In order to isolate the effect of entry on sale prices, we examine weekly scanner data at 85 
                                                 
14
 The minimum size of   depends on the model parameters. See Table B1 of Appendix B.3. 
15
 We focus on Wal-Mart, but this result applies to any “big box” retailer that enters a market where incumbents 
have loyal customers as well as switchers. 
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Dominick’s Finer Foods (DFF) grocery stores before and after Wal-Mart's entry.16 Summarized 
in Table 1, the data contain 2,874 products in 12 categories between 1989 and 1996. The sheer 
size of the data allows us to test not only whether stores responded to Wal-Mart, but also whether 
they focused their response on certain items. 
 The DFF data are particularly well-suited for testing our hypotheses. First, the data begin 
when Wal-Mart’s presence in the Chicago-area was limited to a single store and continues 
through the opening of 26 additional stores. The near absence of Wal-Mart prior to the sample 
period allows us to view each store's initial reaction to Wal-Mart rather than the later 
introduction of a larger supercenter.
17
 Second, having weekly observations of the same stores 
and products allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity that is constant over time. For 
example, customer demographics vary from place to place but are unlikely to change enough 
during the sample period to affect the pricing strategy of a particular store. Third, the data 
contain the specific location of each store, allowing us to measure the driving distance to the 
nearest Wal-Mart for each week. 
The Dominick’s data have been widely used to examine pricing behavior. And while no 
study has examined Wal-Mart’s entry on Dominick’s behavior, Hoch, Kim, and Montgomery 
(1995) imply that the chain would have needed to adjust its pricing behavior following the entry 
of Wal-Mart. They demonstrate that a Dominick’s store’s distance and comparative size to the 
nearest low price warehouse store is a significant determinant of store-level price elasticity. 
                                                 
16
 The DFF data are a joint venture between the chain and the James M. Kilts Center, University of Chicago Booth 
School of Business. The selection process is outlined in Appendix C.  
17
 Because the sample period is early in the chain's expansion, the Wal-Mart stores which entered Chicago before 
1996 were discount stores rather than supercenters. This distinction is important because Wal-Mart’s discount stores 
do not sell fresh grocery products. Nevertheless, there is substantial overlap between the products in at Dominick’s 
and those sold by Wal-Mart discount stores. Based on current stores, Dominick's stores directly competed with Wal-
Mart discount stores on most of its products, and all of the products in the DFF sample used in this paper. As we will 
show, the demand at Dominick’s stores is heavily influenced by Wal-Mart’s entry, and if anything, the slight 
difference in products would only reduce the effect that we estimate. 
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Moreover, Hoch, Drèze, and Purk's (1994) work with the data suggests that stores would not 
have been able to simply lower their prices. They show that Dominick’s profit would be 
significantly reduced if the chain used a low price strategy rather than a Hi-Lo pricing strategy. 
We begin our empirical examination of Dominick’s response to Wal-Mart entry by 
showing that the timing and location of Wal-Mart’s entry does not seem to have been influenced 
by Dominick’s stores. Second, we show that individual stores appear to deviate from the chain’s 
pricing structure by having sales rather than lowering regular prices. Next, we analyze whether 
the introduction of Wal-Mart significantly affected the number of customers that visited 
Dominick’s stores. Finally, we estimate the effect of Wal-Mart’s entry on Dominick’s frequency 
of sales across the entire store, across each product category, and across popular products within 
each category. 
 
3.1 Defining Entry and Competition With Wal-Mart 
Few Wal-Marts entered immediately next to an existing Dominick’s store, but other 
stores would also have competed with Wal-Mart. In general, stores in a geographic area fight 
over the same set of customers, but the size of that area depends on roads, traffic patterns, and 
other location characteristics. Therefore, rather than selecting a binary measure of competition, 
we use the driving distance to the nearest Wal-Mart as a proxy for the intensity of competition 
with Wal-Mart.
18
 Using Thomas Holmes’ Wal-Mart location data (2011), we compute        , 
the shortest driving distance to a Wal-Mart from store j during week t.
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates Wal-Mart’s growth by mapping the location and approximate entry 
date of every store in the Chicago-area prior to 1996. Expanding towards the city-center, Wal-
                                                 
18
 Hoch et al. (1995) also measure competition using driving distance. In the Data Appendix, we show that the 
empirical results are qualitatively similar if we replace the continuous variable with mileage cutoffs. 
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Mart stores opened in waves. Early stores were located in the suburbs, whereas each succeeding 
wave was located about 15 miles nearer to the city center than the previous wave. Holmes argues 
that this pattern of entry allowed the chain to sustain distributional efficiency during expansion.
19
 
Wal-Mart’s entry location and timing thus seems to be determined by logistical efficiency rather 
than the time-varying unobserved factors that affect Dominick’s frequency of sales.  
Given the pattern discussed above, Wal-Mart’s entry was somewhat predictable. Nearby 
Dominick’s stores would have certainly known that Wal-Mart was coming once construction 
started, and maybe even before that given the public procedures involved in obtaining building 
permits. Because we do not have precise dates at which the plans for a new Wal-Mart store were 
made known to incumbent retailers, we measure competition with Wal-Mart on the basis of the 
date in which the store opened for business. We, therefore, will be roughly comparing the 
frequency of sales before and after Wal-Mart opened. Thus, if Dominick’s preemptively 
increased the frequency of sales, then our estimates of the effect of Wal-Mart’s entry would be 
biased towards zero.
20
 
 
3.2 Chain Structure of Pricing 
 One of the primary drawbacks with using the Dominick’s data is the possibility that 
prices were set at the chain level. If this were the case, then we would not expect to see store-
specific responses to Wal-Mart, but rather a coordinated response across the entire chain. 
Instead, we would either see a delayed response (when a store was not allowed to act when it 
needed to) or an accelerated response (i.e. as a store was forced to act before it needed to) in the 
store-level data as the chain might only take action when a critical number of stores were close to 
                                                 
19
 This interpretation is also consistent with Dube, Lester, and Eidlin (2007) and Neumark et al. (2008). 
20
 We show in the Data Appendix that the high frequency data is not leading to spurious results. 
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Wal-Mart. The existence of chain-wide prices does not rule out the possibility of any response, 
but would change the level of aggregation appropriate for this analysis. 
Dominick’s reportedly made pricing decisions based on geographic areas. As stated by 
the data’s documentation, “DFF priced products by 16 zones. Within each zone, there was 
supposed to be a uniform regular price (promoted prices are the same, chainwide)”. Note that the 
quote states that regular prices would be the same within a zone and publically advertised sale 
prices would be the same across the entire chain. The statement suggests that an individual 
store’s regular price response to Wal-Mart would be limited, but does not rule out the potential 
for store-specific sale prices. Indeed, the data contain very few store-specific regular prices 
within a zone. With the exception of a few weeks, over 90 percent of regular prices were the 
same within a zone. Therefore before we use the store-level data, we must examine the extent to 
which sale prices varied across stores within a zone.
21
 
Looking the three largest zones, Figure 2 illustrates the fraction of stores participating in 
sales.
22
 While it was common for an item to be on sale at all stores, many more stores opted out 
of a sale occurring in the zone than opted out of the zone’s regular price. In an average week, 
31% of stores did not have sales on items that were on sale in at least one other store in Zone 1, 
34% in Zone 2, and 25% in Zone 12. Stores thus seem to have been able to set their own sale 
prices, and could have individually responded to Wal-Mart entry. 
                                                 
21
 In the Data Appendix, we show that there is a negative relationship between competition with Wal-Mart and 
regular prices for 8 of the 12 categories, but the size of the effects are relatively small. The effect is also larger at the 
zone-level.  
22
 The DFF data contain flags indicating whether UPC   was on sale at a store   during week  . While a flag 
correctly indicates when there was a deal, the documentation suggests that some deals may have gone unflagged. To 
capture these missing sales, we separately flag any price that declined and returned back to its original price or 
higher within two weeks. This technique has also been used by Campbell and Eden (2005) and Eden and Jaremski 
(2010). Using only the original sale indicator does not qualitatively change the results. Our final sale dummy 
variable,          , is the union of the two measures. 
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An interesting pattern emerges when we compare the fraction to the change in each 
zone's average driving distance to Wal-Mart. First, a store’s sale price behavior was more likely 
to deviate from their zone’s as Wal-Mart entered their area. The fraction of stores not 
participating in a sale falls from around 80% to 60% as the distance to Wal-Mart declined for 
each zone. This is consistent with individual stores located nearest to a new Wal-Mart selecting 
more things to put on sale than the rest of the stores in the zone.  Second, while there were fewer 
zone-wide sales at the end of the sample than the beginning, sale behavior converges within the 
zone slightly when the distance to Wal-Mart was constant for a year or two. For instance, the 
fraction of stores not participating in a sale rises back about 10% from its lowest price by the end 
of the period. In this way, individual stores might have needed to respond to Wal-Mart’s entry 
until the zone decided to take action.  
 While Dominick’s could have responded to Wal-Mart by lowering the regular price or 
increasing their frequency of sales, the data show that any regular price response would largely 
only exist at the zone-level. However, because we are more interested in sale prices, we examine 
Dominick’s response both at the store and zone level in order to capture the full effect of Wal-
Mart’s entry on Dominick’s. 
 
3.3 Wal-Mart and Shopper Visits to Dominick’s  
Dominick’s sells many products that Wal-Mart did not sell so it is possible that the chain 
would not have been dramatically affected by the introduction of Wal-Mart. Therefore, we start 
by testing whether Wal-Mart’s entry had a negative effect on a store’s customer base. 
Specifically, we examine whether Wal-Mart entry affected the number of customers that make a 
purchase from each Dominick’s stores each week.  
 14 
 
 
The DFF database contains a customer count file that indicates the number of visits per 
store during each day in the sample. We estimate the effect of Wal-Mart entry using the fixed 
effects panel estimator.  The dependent variable (     ) is the first difference of the logarithm of 
shoppers visiting store  j during week t.  The independent variable (        ) is the change in 
driving distance in miles from store  j to the nearest Wal-Mart in week t. The regression is: 
                                      (3)  
where    is a vector of quarter dummies to control for seasonal variation in the growth rate of 
customer visits,   is the unobserved store heterogeneity that is fixed over time, and        is the 
error term. In this specification, the unobserved heterogeneity can be interpreted as the store 
specific growth rate in customer visits. 
The regression results from Table 2 indicate that Dominick’s lost about 5% of shopper 
visits due to Wal-Mart entry. The distance to the nearest Wal-Mart fell by an average of about 
200 log points and the point estimate from the regression above is 0.024.  The results are also 
similar when total revenue is used as the dependent variable.  We conclude that although there 
were substantial differences in the products offered by Dominick’s and Wal-Mart, Dominick’s 
would have competed with Wal-Mart on some level for certain types of customers. 
  
3.4 Wal-Mart and the Store-Wide Frequency of Sales 
We start to examine Dominick’s sale price behavior by plotting the average driving 
distance to Wal-Mart and DFF's sales frequency for selected categories.
23
 In Figure 3, the 
fraction of products on sale rises as driving distance falls. For example, during October of 1991, 
a 45 percent drop in the average distance to Wal-Mart (from 20 to 11 miles) corresponds with a 
                                                 
23
 Displayed categories are Bathroom Tissue, Bottled Juices, Cereals, Soft Drinks, and Tuna.  
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50 percent increase in the trend component of the sales (from 12 to 18 percent). This graph 
indicates that the chain-wide frequency of sales increased rapidly following Wal-Mart entry. 
Two additional conclusions are visible in Figure 3. First, and consistent with the results in 
Singh, Hansen, and Blattberg (2006), the incumbent pricing response does not begin until Wal-
Mart moves into a reasonable competitive distance. Movements in Wal-Mart prior to that cutoff 
do not seem to affect Dominick’s behavior in any visible way. Second, the increased frequency 
of sales begins to slightly dissipate after three years. The results are similar to Franklin (2001) 
who finds that Wal-Mart’s market share grows over time. This growth is likely due to customers 
adjusting to Wal-Mart’s presence and becoming less responsive to sales on individual items. 
Nevertheless, the frequency of sales remains at least 7 percentage points higher than its initial 
value. 
Building on the aggregate picture, we proceed with Store-Week and Zone-Week linear 
regressions that control for unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable (        ) is the 
percentage of products on sale in store j during week t, and the independent variable (       ) is 
the driving distance in miles from store/zone j to the nearest Wal-Mart in week t.
 
The model we 
estimate is given in equation (4).
 24
: 
                                      (4)  
Reported in Table 3, the frequency of sales is negatively correlated with a store’s and a 
zone's distance to the nearest Wal-Mart. A 35 mile reduction in the distance to Wal-Mart is 
associated with about a 1 percentage point increase in the fraction of products on sale in a store, 
and a 0.9 percentage point increase in the fraction of products on sale across a zone. Relative to 
                                                 
24
 A Hausman test finds that a fixed effect estimator is appropriate (rather than a random effects estimator). We also 
test the assumption that      is strictly exogenous by estimating the following model using the fixed effects estimator: 
                                              
The Wald test fails to reject the strict exogeneity hypothesis (   ) so we conclude that the assumption is valid. 
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the average frequency of sales (around 12.5%), these effects are both statistically and 
economically significant. Moreover, the coefficients generally increase when we control for the 
liner trend or disaggregate to the category level. 
 
3.5 Product-Level Effect of Wal-Mart Entry on Frequency of Sales 
The results indicate that Dominick’s increased their average sale frequency in response to 
Wal-Mart's entry. If these additional sales were intended to induce certain customer groups to 
make a trip to the store, then we would expect the additional sales to be focused on key products 
or categories rather than all products. Therefore, we look at the product-level data and we 
estimate linear probability regressions for each category.
25
 Each observation is a UPC-Store-
Week, and the dependent variable           is a binary indicator of whether product   was on sale 
in store   during week  . We measure an individual product’s popularity as its share of category 
revenue over its life and across all stores.
26
  
We begin with a simple model that averages Wal-Mart's effect across all products: 
                                           t                                               
where      is unobserved UPC-Store heterogeneity that is fixed over time. A negative 
   coefficient implies that the average frequency of sales across the category rose in response to 
Wal-Mart. Next, we add the interaction of        and         to evaluate whether stores selected 
popular products to discount. The model becomes: 
                                               t                    (6) 
                                                 
25
 The separate category regressions are necessary due to the large number of observations. However, estimating 
separate regressions for each category does not lead to different results than aggregating. Results from probit or logit 
models are qualitatively similar to those found in our linear probability model. 
26
 Our contention is that        is determined by consumer preference rather than by store-level weekly promotion 
fluctuations. However, to make sure that the variable exogenous to store-activity, we do not include a product’s own 
revenue in the total. Hosken and Reiffen (2004) use a similar procedure. 
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Here, the effect of competition with Wal-Mart depends on the category (through   ) as well as 
the product’s popularity (through    .  
Table 4 shows the results of the model in equation (5). In total, four out of 12 categories 
have a significantly negative coefficient on        , whereas 6 had a statistically significant and 
positive coefficient. The results thus indicate that Dominick’s did not lower the frequency of 
sales for all of its products in response to Wal-Mart, but might have targeted specific categories. 
Looking at Table 5, those categories with a significantly negative estimate for    tended to be 
higher revenue categories (and higher purchase frequency categories). This indicates that 
Dominick’s focused its response on certain key categories and characteristics. 
When the interaction with share of revenue is added to the model as in Table 6, the 
negative and significant category-level effects all but disappear.    remains significantly 
negative for only 2 categories (Toilet Tissue and Bottled Juice), while    is significantly 
negative for 11 of the 12 categories. This means that the effect of Wal-Mart entry at the product 
level depends on the product’s popularity rather than the type of product. The frequency of sales 
increased for popular products, but stayed the same or declined for less popular items.  
 The coefficient estimates of equation (6) are summarized in Figure 4, which displays the 
average effect of a 35 mile reduction in the distance to Wal-Mart for the 5
th
, 50
th
, and 95
th
 
percentiles of       . The median response is generally close to zero, but the frequency of sales 
of products at the 95
th
 percentile was generally 5 to 10 percent higher after Wal-Mart’s entry. 
The UPC-level approach, therefore, provides additional evidence that the rise in sales across 
DFF stores was the result of competitive behavior rather than a general increase in sales. 
 The results are consistent with “loss-leader” models that suggest firms advertise low 
prices on only a few products (often below marginal cost) to attract shoppers who purchase other 
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profitable products.
27
 For example, DeGraba (2006) illustrates how a low price on turkeys during 
Thanksgiving will attract a Thanksgiving dinner host who will also purchase a long list of other 
products needed for the dinner. Not every loss-leader can be so creatively selected, but the 
marketing literature has proposed several sets of loss-leader characteristics. Hosken and Reiffen 
(2004) argue that “loss-leader” products had to be popular in order to attract enough demand, 
whereas Lal and Matutes (1994) argue that “loss-leaders” products should be purchased often 
and costly to store. In this way, the increase in the frequency of sales at Dominick’s is likely a 
“loss-leader” response to Wal-Mart’s entry. 
 
4. Conclusion  
 Drawing from related strands of research in the marketing and economics literature, we 
find that an increase in the frequency of sales can be a rational response to competition with a 
low cost retailer. The data from a representative chain of grocery stores support this strategy: 
individual stores which came into competition with Wal-Mart significantly increased their 
average frequency of sales. Moreover, the increased price promotion activity was focused on 
“loss-leader” products, providing additional evidence that the behavior was a strategic response 
to Wal-Mart entry rather than a coincident change in some other factor (e.g. promotion activity 
initiated by manufacturers).  
This study has implications for two other areas of research. First, there have been several 
macroeconomic studies that evaluate the role of sales in price adjustment. The topic was initiated 
with the observation that prices change frequently, but that many of these changes are the result 
of sales (Bils and Klenow 2004). Recent studies such as Chevalier and Kashyap (2010), Kehoe 
                                                 
27
 Loss-leading could suggest a permanently low price or a temporarily low price depending on the model, but 
traditionally it is explained using the later. 
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and Midrigan (2010), Eichenbaum, Jaimovich, and Rebelo (2011), and Guimaraes and Sheedy 
(2011) attempt to reconcile the frequent adjustment of prices, that is largely due to sales, with the 
cornerstone assumption of price stickiness embedded in New Keynesian macroeconomic models. 
These studies tend to find that nominal rigidities are still important in spite of the frequent price 
adjustments associated with sales. Our results, however, caution against concluding that sales are 
unimportant for aggregate price adjustment because we show that temporary price reductions 
may be used in response as a persistent shock.  
Second, Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) find that the fraction of price quotes that are 
sales has increased substantially over the last two decades. Certain product categories, such as 
breakfast cereal or potato chips, are now “on sale” twice as often as they were in the late 1980’s. 
As the expansion of Wal-Mart took place over the same period, our results suggest that Wal-
Mart could be at least partially responsible for the rise in sales.  
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Appendix A: Demand in a Hotelling Model 
Suppose there is a measure 1 of switchers who are distributed uniformly across the unit 
interval and differ only in their cost of visiting the entrant. Denote a switcher’s type as        . 
Switchers of type   face a cost of visiting the entrant of          where    is the highest cost any 
switcher incurs to visit the new store (but no cost to visit an incumbent). The marginal type who 
would be indifferent between visiting the new store or not is    
     
  
. All switchers of type 
  
     
  
 purchase from the entrant, and the rest purchase from the lowest priced incumbent. 
 
Appendix B: Proofs of All Propositions 
Proof of Proposition 1 
To prove that choosing a price of   in every period is part of an SPNE in pure strategies, 
we propose a punishment for deviating and then check to make sure it is credible and effective. 
Because there is no pure strategy equilibrium in the stage game (except in very special cases), 
the punishment cannot involve reverting to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium forever. Suppose 
the punishment for deviating is to charge a price equal to marginal cost,  , for   periods. In 
period    , both firms resume charging a price of   unless another deviation occurs. If either 
firm deviates during the punishment, the punishment starts over from the beginning. The 
duration of the punishment,  , is chosen to be as large as possible such that: 
     
 
  
     
   
 
      
   
 
This inequality ensures that the punishment is credible. The RHS is the continuation value of 
charging   forever assuming that the opponent charges something less than  . The LHS is the 
present value of profits assuming that after the punishment, both players go back to charging 
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  every period. Rearranging terms, we can see that the most severe punishment that is credible 
would be to choose the largest   such that: 
   
  
    
 
(B.1) 
For this threat to deter deviations, we must ensure that a one shot deviation is unprofitable. 
Therefore, the punishment will prevent deviations if:  
   
 
  
     
   
            
     
 
  
     
   
 
Which will be satisfied as long as  
    
   
 
   
  
 
 
 
(B.2) 
Which implies that the lower bound for   is 
 
 
 for the SPNE to exist. Combining (B.1) and (B.2): 
  
   
   
 
(B.3) 
To be clear, (B.3) shows the conditions under which the SPNE exists. The RHS of (B.3) is 
bounded above by 1 and increasing when    . Because we assume that the discount factor, 
       , the larger is  , the larger   must be. This means that the larger the relative size of the 
switchers, the more likely the equilibrium exists. Because total payoffs are maximized by 
charging the highest willingness to pay each period, the equilibrium is Pareto-dominant. 
 
Maximum Profits Attainable by Incumbents 
  
We claim that having a single incumbent charge a low price while the other charges the 
monopoly price results in the highest possible joint profit level for the incumbents.  We prove 
this claim by contradiction. Suppose the cartel found it optimal to set both prices to    . Let 
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     . The cartel’s profits in this case would be         
    
 
 . If instead the cartel 
had one firm charge     and the other charge  , its profits would be: 
          
    
 
             
    
 
  
which is    more than if the cartel set both prices to  . Therefore setting both prices below   
cannot be optimal. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
We prove Proposition 2 in two sections.  First, we establish the prices charged by all firms in the 
equilibrium proposed in section 2.2.  Next we show that the punishment strategy is both credible 
and effective. 
 
Equilibrium Prices 
Below we establish the price that   will charge in every period as well as the “sale” price that   
and   will alternate with the monopoly price  .  Recall that we assume   plays a best response to 
the lowest priced incumbent and the “sale” price is assumed to maximize the single period 
profits of the firm having a sale, given the price that  .  
Without loss of generality, we begin by assuming that      . Because firm   will 
always choose a price             , its profits are: 
      
     
 
                 
   is maximized as long as one of the following conditions hold: 
   
   
  
      
 
  iff        
      
 
  iff        
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which implies that firm  ’s optimal response function is: 
We have already shown that no more than one of the incumbent’s products will be priced below 
 . Without loss of generality, suppose        . The profits earned by firm   are: 
   
 
 
 
 
             
     
 
  iff            and     
           iff        
       iff          
  
We can disregard the second case because we have already argued that   would never allow 
     . Thus the relevant best response function for firm   is characterized by: 
   
           
 
                                       
             
 
(B.6) 
(B.7) 
 Now we proceed to identify the prices   
  and   
  that are mutually best responses. These 
equilibrium prices will depend on the parameters        and  . We are interested in the case in 
which      which is only possible when condition (B.6) holds. There are two possible 
scenarios to consider. The first is when (B.4) also holds, which implies: 
  
          
           
If this were an equilibrium then  ’s share would be 
  
    
 
 
   which implies that the 
cartel would sell to none of the switchers. This is only optimal if   
    because the cartel 
would only charge a price less than   if they could sell to some of the switchers by doing so. 
Thus, the combination of (B.4) and (B.6) cannot represent an equilibrium where   
   . 
The second scenario involving   
    occurs when (B.5) and (B.6) hold: 
        iff      
   
  
 
iff      
 
(B.4) 
(B.5) 
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This implies that  
  
  
 
 
              
  
 
 
           
Next we ensure that the inequalities are satisfied: 
(B.5) requires that   
  
 
 
                 
 
 
   
(B.6) requires   
  
 
 
                         
  
  
 
 
 
     
and 
 
 
                      
 
 
   
The equilibrium price and the parameter space for which they apply are summarized in (B.8): 
 
  
  
 
 
             
  
 
 
          
                         
 
 
    
  
  
 
 
 
     
   
(B.8) 
 
Proof that the punishment is credible and effective 
 To complete the proof of Proposition 2, we must show that the punishment outlined in 
Section 2 is credible and harsh enough to deter firms from deviating. In the analysis below, we 
take a different approach than Lal (1990) in order add in marginal costs and address some 
technical issues. To compress the notation, we define the following additional variables: 
      profit to an incumbent charging   when the other charges     respectively 
        profits to a defecting firm when the other firm charges     respectively 
       
 
   
 
  
   
  discounted profits of selling only to your loyal customers forever 
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The punishment strategies given in equation (2) are credible ((i) and (ii)) and effective 
((iii), (iv), (v)) under the following conditions:  
 i           
        
       
      
  
   
    
            
 ii        
         
 
    
             
 iii     
       
 
          will not deviate in period  
  
(iv)      
       
       
       
             will not deviate in period  
    
(v)     
       
 
        will not deviate in period  
  
 Conditions (i) and (ii) state that the continuation value of the punishment sequence for 
the two incumbents (   and   ) must be at least as large as the discounted profits from serving 
only loyal customers,  . Conditions (i) and (ii) also indicate how    and   are selected.    is 
chosen so that it is as large as possible without violating inequality (i), ensuring that the threat is 
as severe as it can be and still be credible. The price   is chosen to satisfy (ii), that      . 
Condition (iii) is required so that   will not deviate in period   .  Condition (iv) ensures 
that   will not deviate in period     .  Finally, (v) ensures that   will not deviate in period   . 
We now analyze when it is possible for conditions (i) – (v) hold. First notice that (iii) 
always holds when (v) holds. This is simply because          is the profit one incumbent 
makes when the other charges a price of  . The quantity    is the profit that an incumbent could 
make if it were to deviate when the other is charging a price    . Since    is the best a firm 
can do when the other charges  , we know that      . Therefore if (v) holds, so does (iii). . 
Because (iii) is redundant, we analyze conditions (i) (ii) (iv) and (v) to find the parameter 
values for which they can be satisfied. Rearranging terms in (i) we can see that the duration of 
the punishment,    depends on 
  
  
. Specifically,    will be the largest integer that satisfies:  
 29 
 
 
   
  
  
      
   
   
  
(B.9) 
To interpret this condition, notice that the RHS is increasing in    (because        ). 
Secondly, the ratio 
  
  
   can be interpreted as a measure of the temptation to cheat when the 
firm is supposed to be charging  , the high price. The larger the temptation, the harsher the 
punishment must be. 
The next step is to use inequalities (iv) and (v) to determine what values of   make the 
threat severe enough. It turns out that the lower bound on   also depends on the ratio 
  
  
. First, 
notice that     will be less than but arbitrarily close to   . If the incumbent deviates when her 
opponent charges   , then the best she can do is to slightly undercut her opponent’s price and 
obtain a profit slightly less than   . Because    is the upper bound on the single period profits 
earned by   if she deviates, then we can substitute    for     in (iv) and still be certain that   will 
be deterred from deviating in period     . After the substitution, (iv) and (v) can be written as: 
 
  
  
  
    
 
 
             
             
    (B.10) 
This is a bit tricky to interpret. When the RHS of the inequality is positive, then it must 
be larger than 
  
  
. When the RHS is negative, conditions (iv) and (v) are always satisfied. The 
existence of an SPNE of the form described above depends on the magnitude of 
  
  
 which we 
know is larger than 1. In Table B1, we provide different levels of 
  
  
 with the corresponding    
for the minimum level of   that make the strategy a credible and effective threat. 
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Table B1      
  
  
 
 
1.1 1.5 2 5 10 
     
 
.96 .82 .83 .74 .69 
         2 2 3 3 4 
These results differ from those reported in Lal (1990). He claims that the strategy profile 
given in (2) is an SPNE for all values of      , regardless of the level of  
  
  
. We show here 
that the minimum possible discount factor depends on the size of the gains from alternating sales 
relative to the “outside option”. Nevertheless, even small levels of profits gained by selling to the 
switchers will result in alternating sales if the interest rate is low enough. 
The final step is to show that charging a price of   and   in alternating periods using the 
proposed punishment strategies is a Nash equilibrium. Said differently, a one shot deviation 
cannot be profitable. This will be true if: 
 
 
 
    
                  
(B.11) 
It is easy to show that (B.11) is satisfied if (v) is satisfied. Thus, the strategy profile in (2) 
constitutes a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium as long as   is large enough given 
  
  
 . 
 
Appendix C: Dominick’s Finer Foods Sample Selection 
The DFF sample offers a large number of products and stores, but there are several 
stores, UPCs, and store-UPC cells with very few observations. The main concern is that we 
cannot be sure of the reason for sparsely populated data. For instance, a UPC-Store cell with only 
one year (out of a possible seven) may represent a product deletion or incomplete data records. 
We want to make sure that the variation in the fraction of products on sale at a particular store is 
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not affected by changes in the mix of available data. In response to comments on this paper, we 
have also eliminated categories that we suspect were not sold at Wal-Mart stores at the time.  
Attempting to balance this objective with the desire to use as much data as possible, we 
implemented the following selection mechanism: 
1) Drop any categories that we suspect were not sold at Wal-Mart. 
2) Drop the final 18 weeks of the sample because represents only a partial-year of data.  
3) Drop any category that does not span the entire sample period.  
4) Next, we break up categories based on the relative number of products.  
a. For smaller categories (Bathroom Tissue, Bottled Juices, Cereals, Dish Detergent, 
Fabric Softeners, Laundry Detergent, Paper Towels, Snack Crackers, and 
Toothpaste),  
i. Drop all UPC-Store cells with less than 165 observations  
ii. Drop any store with less than 40 products in a category  
b. For large categories (Analgesics, Cookies, and Soft Drinks)  
i. Drop all UPC-Store cells with less than 180 observations  
ii. Drop any store with less than 50 products in a category  
To illustrate how much of the data is excluded, Table C1 presents the summary statistics before 
and after the sample selection is taken. Although we delete two-thirds of the UPC-Store cells, 
our sample still accounts around 80% of the raw sample’s revenue. 
Note: Wal-Mart locations and entry dates were obtained from Holmes (2011). Dominick’s locations come from the 
online documentation of the DFF database. 
Figure 1: Location and Entry Year of Wal-Mart Stores in the Chicago Area
Figure 2: Fraction of Stores Participating in a Sale
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Zone 12 
% Stores Having Sale (Left Axis)* %Reduction in Distance to WalMart (Right Axis) 
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Zone 2 
Notes: The figures plot the percent of stores having a sale on a product conditional on the product being on sale in at least 
one other store in the zone. This measure is averaged across UPCs. We show only zones with more than 7 stores and include 
UPCs that were sold in at least 7 stores. *The lower the value, the more autonomy individual stores exercised in their 
promotion decisions within the zone. The dotted line is the percent change in the average distance to the nearest Wal-Mart 
for stores in the zone.  
Figure 3: Average Distance to Wal-Mart and Seasonally Adjusted Frequency of Sales
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Notes: Average distance is the simple average across stores of the driving distance to the closest Wal-Mart. The 
other two series use two different smoothing techniques (moving average and HP-filter) to plot the fraction of 
products on sale. 
Figure 4: Estimated Change in Frequency of Sales Following a 35 mile drop in dist  for 95th , 
50th, and 5th percentiles of share of category revenue 
-10.0% 
-8.0% 
-6.0% 
-4.0% 
-2.0% 
0.0% 
2.0% 
4.0% 
6.0% 
8.0% 
10.0% 
A
n
a
lg
e
si
cs
 
B
o
tt
le
d
 J
u
ic
e
 
C
er
ea
l 
C
o
o
k
ie
s 
D
is
h
 D
et
er
g
en
t 
F
a
b
ri
c 
S
o
ft
en
er
 
L
a
u
n
d
ry
 D
et
er
g
en
t 
P
a
p
er
 T
o
w
el
s 
S
o
ft
 D
ri
n
k
s 
S
n
a
ck
 C
ra
ck
er
s 
T
o
o
th
p
a
st
e
 
B
a
th
ro
o
m
 T
is
su
e
 
C
h
a
n
g
e 
in
 F
re
q
u
en
cy
 o
f 
S
a
le
s 
95th Percentile 5th Percentile Median 
Notes: This figure plots the estimated effect of a 35 mile decline in distance to Wal-Mart (approximately the 
sample average) on the frequency of sales for each of three share percentiles, by category. The values are 
calculated by evaluating Equation (6) at different revenue share percentiles (5%, median, and 95%) for each 
category. Stars denote categories that have a negative and significant coefficient on share. The underlying 
Category
# of 
UPCs
# of 
Stores
Avg. 
Price ($)
Analgesic 320 85 5.4
Bathroom Tissue 57 81 1.9
Bottled Juices 217 85 1.8
Cereals 227 85 2.2
Cookies 428 85 3.1
Dish Detergent 125 85 2.1
Fabric Softeners 156 85 2.3
Laundry Detergent 236 85 1.4
Paper Towels 76 80 5.4
Snack Crackers 180 85 2.2
Soft Drinks 564 85 2.3
Toothpaste 288 85 2.3
All Products 2,874 85 2.7
Table 1: Summary of Dominick's Sample
% of Sale Obs.
Profit Margin 
(%)
Avg. Quantity 
Sold
3.9 31.3 1.4
15.4 16.9 13.9
6 29.2 72.7
10.7 16.6 9.5
9.3 27.7 16.7
7.6 22.1 6.1
13.5 24.9 9
14.2 18 23
21.2 22.1 5.6
17 27.1 7.6
11.7 23 16.8
Notes: The selection of the sample is described in Appendix C. We visited modern stores to determine whether a 
product category was sold in Wal-Mart.
13.3 16.5 33.1
7.9 23.7 2.8
ΔLn(Number of Customer 
Trips)
Distance .0241***
to Wal-Mart [.0071]
Seasonal Dummies Yes
Observations 26,605
Groups 86
R^2 0.001
Notes: T-Statistics are in brackets. Standard errors are clustered 
by store, and regressions are weighted by Revenue Share of Cell. 
* denotes significance at 10%; ** at 5% level and *** at 1% 
level. 
Table 2: Linear Panel Regressions of the Change in 
Customer Trips on Distance to Wal-Mart
Table 3: Linear Panel Regressions of %Sale  on Distance to Wal-Mart
Distance -0.034*** -0.074*** -0.037*** -0.122*** -0.0260*** -0.133*** -0.0347*** -0.143***
to Wal-Mart [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.0077] [0.0175] [0.008] [0.016]
Linear Trend -0.006*** -0.013*** -0.0147*** -0.0149***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.0019] [0.0018]
Observations 31,833 31,833 542,758 542,758 5,655 5,655 74,805 74,805
Groups 85 85 1,519 1,519 15 15 210 210
R^2 0.055 0.073 0.01 0.027 0.065 0.197 0.038 0.062
Zone-Category
% of UPCs on Sale During Week
Store Store-Category Zone
Notes: The first two columns report results of a fixed effects panel estimate of two different models that use the store as the unit of analysis. The second 
column controls for a linear trend while the first column does not. The second two columns report analogous results from a random effects estimate of two 
models in which a category-store is the unit of analysis. The last four columns repeat the exercise with data aggregated to the zone level.  The store and zone 
level models includes a vector of quarter dummies and the store-category and zone-category models include a vector of category x quarter dummies to 
control for seasonal effects for the chain and category respectively. The Distance coefficients are reported in percentage points per mile. T-Statistics are in 
brackets. Standard errors are clustered by store, and regressions are weighted by Revenue Share of Cell. * denotes significance at 10%; ** at 5% level and 
*** at 1% level.  
Distance 0.071*** 0.087*** 0.056*** 0.075*** -0.084*** -0.338*** -0.103*** -0.403*** -0.074*** -0.092*** -0.087*** -0.115***
to Wal-Mart (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.014) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Linear Trend 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.003*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
R^2 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.009 0.002 0.010 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
Distance 0.017*** -0.052*** 0.008 -0.058*** -0.005 -0.118*** -0.005 -0.132*** 0.009** -0.163*** 0.013 -0.204***
to Wal-Mart (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.015) (0.004) (0.006) (0.011) (0.014)
Linear Trend -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.032*** -0.034***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R^2 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.008
Distance 0.049*** -0.219*** 0.072*** -0.243*** -0.015 -0.363*** -0.016 -0.388*** -0.038*** -0.090*** -0.048*** -0.082***
to Wal-Mart (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.027) (0.034) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.010)
Linear Trend -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.061*** -0.055*** -0.009*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
R^2 0.001 0.016 0.002 0.018 0.002 0.017 0.001 0.017 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Distance 0.167*** -0.113*** 0.172*** -0.134*** 0.044*** 0.056*** 0.044*** 0.062*** -0.226*** -0.586*** -0.263*** -0.729***
to Wal-Mart (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.014) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.024) (0.034)
Linear Trend -0.050*** -0.048*** 0.002*** 0.003*** -0.061*** -0.068***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
R^2 0.014 0.023 0.015 0.024 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.018 0.007 0.023
Table 4:  UPC Panel Regression of Sale Indicator (times 100) on dist
Notes: Reports the estimates from a fixed effects panel regression of sale (a binary variable) on dist and a vector of quarter dummies.  T-Statistics are in brackets. Standard errors are 
clustered by store, and regressions are weighted by Revenue Share of Cell. * denotes significance at 10%; ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. 
Snack Crackers Toothpaste Toilet Tissue
Store-Week 
(N=3,523,478)
Zone-Week 
(N=661,460)
Store-Week 
(N=3,831,736)
Zone-Week 
(N=819,487)
Store-Week 
(N=1,032,093)
Zone-Week 
(N=199,385)
Laundry Detergent Paper Towels Soft Drinks
Store-Week 
(N=3,354,941)
Zone-Week 
(N=645,351)
Store-Week 
(N=1,110,969)
Zone-Week 
(N=243,761)
Store-Week 
(N=10,900,000)
Zone-Week 
(N=2,085,206)
Cookies Dish Detergent Fabric Softener
Store-Week 
(N=7,968,211)
Zone-Week 
(N=1,522,596)
Store-Week 
(N=2,367,874)
Zone-Week 
(N=462,489)
Store-Week 
(N=2,674,779)
Zone-Week 
(N=512,926)
Analgesics Bottled Juice Cereal
Store-Week 
(N=4,522,140)
Zone-Week 
(N=1,095,181)
Store-Week 
(N=4,095,872)
Zone-Week 
(N=777,736)
Store-Week 
(N=4,704,742)
Zone-Week 
(N=885,996)
Category
Avg. Quantity 
Sold
Units Sold 
Rank
Avg. 
Revenue
Revenue 
Rank
Coeff. On 
Dist
Soft Drinks 33.1 2 14,045 1 -0.038***
Cereals 9.5 6 7,786 2 -0.074***
Cookies 16.7 4 3,161 3 0.015***
Laundry Detergent 23 3 2,984 4 0.049***
Toilet Tissue 13.9 5 2,738 5 -0.226***
Bottled Juices 72.7 1 2,569 6 -0.084***
Snack Crackers 7.6 8 1,894 7 0.167***
Paper Towels 5.6 10 1,698 8 -0.015
Fabric Softeners 9 7 1,116 9 0.009**
Dish Detergent 6.1 9 1,057 10 -0.005
Analgesic 1.4 12 949 11 0.071***
Toothpaste 2.8 11 720 12 0.044***
All Products 16.8
Notes: The selection of the sample is described in Appendix C. We visited modern stores to determine 
whether a product category was sold in Wal-Mart.
Table 5: Summary of Dominick's Sample
Distance 0.104*** 0.119*** 0.074*** 0.090*** -0.044*** -0.288*** -0.054*** -0.343*** 0.015*** -0.004 0.014** -0.015**
to Wal-Mart (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012) (0.016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
Dist x Share -4.418*** -4.336*** -3.262*** -3.006*** -4.639*** -6.123*** -6.014*** -7.662*** -14.073*** -14.372*** -16.389*** -16.739***
(0.313) (0.312) (0.680) (0.677) (0.443) (0.489) (1.094) (1.233) (0.328) (0.337) (0.780) (0.808)
Linear Trend 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.004*** -0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
R^2 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.009 0.002 0.010 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004
Distance 0.015*** -0.052*** 0.008 -0.057*** 0.055*** -0.048*** 0.075*** -0.042** 0.091*** -0.076*** 0.110*** -0.103***
to Wal-Mart (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.016) (0.018) (0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.020)
Dist x Share 0.380 -0.052 0.009 -0.463 -4.223*** -5.102*** -5.902*** -6.791*** -7.044*** -7.600*** -8.574*** -9.103***
(0.306) (0.319) (0.687) (0.722) (0.448) (0.465) (1.049) (1.087) (0.602) (0.631) (1.578) (1.656)
Linear Trend -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.032*** -0.034***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R^2 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.009
Distance 0.116*** -0.154*** 0.140*** -0.178*** 0.101*** -0.222*** 0.119*** -0.235*** 0.056*** 0.003 0.058*** 0.022*
to Wal-Mart (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.043) (0.045) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.012)
Dist x Share -7.958*** -7.710*** -8.314*** -7.985*** -3.705*** -4.589*** -4.493*** -5.129*** -33.521*** -33.721*** -39.093*** -39.249***
(0.593) (0.659) (1.472) (1.648) (0.377) (0.420) (0.842) (0.927) (0.826) (0.839) (2.115) (2.132)
Linear Trend -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.061*** -0.055*** -0.009*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
R^2 0.001 0.017 0.002 0.018 0.002 0.017 0.002 0.017 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004
Distance 0.111*** -0.147*** 0.106*** -0.174*** 0.125*** 0.131*** 0.127*** 0.138*** -0.196*** -0.524*** -0.196*** -0.627***
to Wal-Mart (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.019) (0.019) (0.044) (0.048)
Dist x Share 6.601*** 4.214*** 7.996*** 5.303*** -9.793*** -9.708*** -11.130*** -10.960*** -0.988** -2.038*** -2.243** -3.463***
(0.386) (0.404) (0.842) (0.904) (0.365) (0.366) (0.831) (0.836) (0.421) (0.474) (0.994) (1.182)
Linear Trend -0.049*** -0.047*** 0.001*** 0.002** -0.061*** -0.068***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
R^2 0.014 0.023 0.016 0.024 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.019 0.007 0.023
Notes: Share is the upc’s average share of category revenue. See notes to Table 4 for other details. * denotes significance at 10%; ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. 
Table 6:  UPC Panel Regression of Sale Indicator (times 100) on Distance to Wal-Mart and Share of Revenue times Distance to Wal-Mart
Snack Crackers Toothpaste Toilet Tissue
Store-Week 
(N=3,523,478) Zone-Week (N=661,460)
Store-Week 
(N=3,831,736) Zone-Week (N=819,487)
Store-Week 
(N=1,032,093) Zone-Week (N=199,385)
Laundry Detergent Paper Towels Soft Drinks
Store-Week 
(N=3,354,941) Zone-Week (N=645,351)
Store-Week 
(N=1,110,969) Zone-Week (N=243,761)
Store-Week 
(N=10,900,000)
Zone-Week 
(N=2,085,206)
Cookies Dish Detergent Fabric Softener
Store-Week 
(N=7,968,211)
Zone-Week 
(N=1,522,596)
Store-Week 
(N=2,367,874) Zone-Week (N=462,489)
Store-Week 
(N=2,674,779) Zone-Week (N=512,926)
Analgesics Bottled Juice Cereal
Store-Week 
(N=4,522,140)
Zone-Week 
(N=1,095,181)
Store-Week 
(N=4,095,872) Zone-Week (N=777,736)
Store-Week 
(N=4,704,742) Zone-Week (N=885,996)
Category
Selected Raw Selected Raw Selected Raw Selected Raw % of Total
Analgesics 85 93 320 641 15,163 40,775 29 39 75%
Bottled Juice 85 93 217 511 14,598 36,656 80 100 80%
Cereals 85 93 227 490 16,221 36,620 227 268 85%
Cookies 85 93 428 1,126 27,669 78,731 98 128 76%
Dish Detergent 85 93 125 287 8,428 22,005 33 46 73%
Fabric Softeners 85 93 156 318 10,244 25,184 35 47 76%
Laundry Detergent 85 93 236 581 14,143 45,047 95 153 62%
Paper Towels 80 93 76 164 4,183 11,741 50 67 75%
Soft Drinks 85 93 564 1,720 36,614 112,017 438 526 83%
Snack Crackers 85 93 180 425 12,425 30,603 58 71 82%
Toothpaste 85 93 288 608 14,281 39,263 23 31 73%
Toilette Tissue 81 93 57 128 3,627 9,867 81 100 81%
Total 2,874 6,999 177,596 488,509 1,247 1,576
Percent 80%
Notes: Comparison of selected sample to raw sample. See description above for selection criteria.
Stores UPCs
36%
Table C1  Sample Selection Summary
Store - UPCs Revenue $Millions
41%
